Restructuring of the electricity industry was expected to improve the operating efficiency of electric power generators, leading to lower production costs and retail prices. Most studies conclude that there have been some efficiency gains, but the subject of whether retail prices have fallen has been contentious. The existing literature has a number of shortcomings, including the use of blunt or inappropriate definitions of restructuring, failure to incorporate the effects of regulatory decisions regarding price caps and stranded cost recovery, and the use of highly aggregated data. Our study addresses many of these problems and thus represents a significant improvement on existing work. We use a detailed firm-level data set to estimate how the markets and institutions established as a part of "restructuring" have affected the difference between prices and costs. Based on a number of different definitions, we find that utilities that have undergone restructuring display significantly higher price-cost markups than utilities that remained traditionally regulated. We find that some elements of restructuring are associated with higher price-cost margins, while others appear to be uncorrelated with prices and costs. The combination of introducing retail competition into an electric utility's operating territory and divestiture of that utility's generating assets has increased costs, but has increased prices even more. In particular, we find an average difference of 2 to 3 cents per kWh between prices and costs that is explained by restructuring rather than by increases in fuel prices. We conclude that restructuring has been beneficial to companies that restructured, but the evidence is far less clear concerning benefits to consumers.
Introduction
Electricity restructuring in the United States has its roots in the combination of the 1970s energy crises and the high costs involved in efforts to decouple the U.S. electric system from the world petroleum market. Poor oversight and management of nuclear power facilities combined with generous contract terms for unconventional generators added to the problem of rising consumer electricity prices. Modern restructuring efforts in the U.S. electricity industry began in 1992 with the first Energy Policy Act, which allowed non-utility generators and marketers to compete in the same nascent wholesale markets as traditional vertically-integrated utilities. The 1996 issuance of Order 888 by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was aimed at increasing competition by removing barriers to access to the utility-owned transmission grid.
Beginning in 1998, individual states began restructuring efforts of their own, with California and Pennsylvania the first to act. Despite the mix of federal and state-level policies, electricity restructuring in most regions and states has several common features Lave 2005, Joskow 2006 ):
1. Traditional electric utilities were vertically unbundled. California, for example, required its three investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to effectively unbundle by divesting themselves of most generation and surrendering control (though not ownership) of transmission assets to an Independent System Operator (ISO) or Regional Transmission Organization (RTO).
1 Utilities in many other states divested themselves of generation assets without an explicit requirement that they do so. Although FERC has promoted surrendering control of transmission assets to RTOs through Order 2000 and its proposed Standard Market Design (SMD), very few utilities have actually surrendered ownership of transmission assets.
The interconnected North American transmission grid is no longer solely operated and
managed by transmission-owning utilities. Many areas of the North American grid are managed by RTOs. These RTOs (and vertically-integrated utilities) dispatch generation 1 There are subtle differences between ISOs and RTOs, the most significant of which is that an RTO is a regional grid operator with a FERC-approved tariff. California currently has an ISO that is seeking FERC approval for its LMP pricing regime. Texas has an ISO that operates similarly to FERC-approved RTOs, but FERC currently does not exercise jurisdiction over the Texas electric system. In this paper, we will use RTO as a generic term meant to encompass all regional grid operators that also run centralized markets for electric energy.
3 resources within their footprints and are responsible for managing congestion on the grid and ensuring that supply and demand are in balance.
3. Many RTOs also run a series of centralized auction markets for electric energy, capacity, transmission rights, and other ancillary services. The exact auction structure varies among RTOs, but common to nearly all are "spot" markets for electric energy, conducted one day ahead and one hour ahead of actual delivery and consumption.
4. A number of states have introduced retail competition for electric generation (as distinct from the transmission and distribution services traditionally provided by the regulated utility). Under retail competition, individual consumers are allowed to choose from among a number of non-utility generation suppliers. Those who do not choose one of these competitive suppliers are assigned to a "default" supplier and electric rate schedule, usually from the incumbent distribution utility.
5. Utilities have been allowed to recover so-called "stranded costs," most of which represent investments made under regulation that would likely not have been made in a competitive environment. Examples include nuclear and renewable generation investments. Stranded cost recovery has come about largely through surcharges on customer bills.
Initially, restructuring was driven by the dual goals of fixing a regulatory system that was perceived to be fundamentally flawed, and reducing prices to consumers. A secondary goal was to reduce the amount of refined petroleum used in U.S. electric generation. For the first eight decades in the history of the electric power industry, prices fell nearly every year as technological advances increased generation efficiency, as shown in Figure 1 . The oil crises in the 1970s, combined with massive cost over-runs in new large generators (particularly nuclear plants), depressed demand and increased costs. Average rates rose accordingly, and on average have continued to rise since then. Morgan, et al. (2005) .
Later stages of electricity restructuring have been driven by a variety of policy goals, including improving operating efficiency at generators, reducing the cross-subsidies present in regulated rates, and reducing pollution. Ultimately, many of the goals of restructuring were focused on reducing costs and prices through the introduction of competitive markets for electric generation (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983, de Vries 2004) . In issuing its preferred electricity market design, FERC stated an explicit policy goal of introducing competition at the retail and wholesale level, so that market prices would reflect marginal generation costs (FERC 2003) .
Particularly in light of wholesale price spikes related to the manipulation of markets in California in 2000-01, the issue of whether restructuring has benefited consumers has been controversial.
We examine the behavior of costs and prices for investor-owned electric utilities under regulation and restructuring. We use a detailed firm-level data set to construct average annual costs of electric service, and compare the difference between our estimated costs and utilityreported electric rates over time, for three different classes of customers. Our data set allows us 5 to decompose "restructuring" into three separate policies: joining an RTO, divestiture of generation assets, and the introduction of retail competition. The way that we construct our cost estimates also allows us to incorporate the effects of rising fuel prices. Given the existing evidence that restructuring has yielded efficiency gains in production, the economic issue becomes how those efficiency gains have been shared between producers and consumers.
Existing policy goals reflect an economic hypothesis that competition should decrease the difference between prices and costs following restructuring, after accounting for fuel price changes. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing evidence on whether electricity restructuring has produced efficiency gains in production, and whether consumers have seen lower electric rates as a result. Section 3 introduces the data and econometric model used in this analysis. A discussion of the results is in Section 4, and Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts.
Electric Restructuring, Production Efficiency, and Retail Prices
Many capital-intensive network industries have successfully been deregulated in one form or another. Natural gas and airline deregulation commenced in 1978, followed by trucking and railroads in 1980. Deregulation in natural gas is generally viewed as having increased industry efficiency and benefited consumers (de Vany and Walls 1993) . Deregulation in transport and shipping industries has also generally been considered successful (Crandall and Ellig 1997, 6 1998). In particular, Crandall and Ellig (1998) note that prices in these industries dropped dramatically (25% or more) within 10 years following the inception of deregulation.
Smaller (but still significant) efficiency gains of 3% to 13% were expected as a result of restructuring in electricity (Christensen and Greene 1976 , Klitgaard and Reddy 2000 , Kleit and Terrell 2001 . In electric generation, capital costs represent a large proportion of total costs, so efficiency gains in production of electricity in the short-term were expected to stem largely from using low-cost generation assets more intensively. Increased labor productivity was expected, but since labor makes up only 7% of the total cost of electricity (Apt 2005) , the contribution of labor to overall cost reductions was likely to be small. In the long-run, old and inefficient plants were expected to be replaced.
Overall, restructuring (or the anticipation of competition) appears to have produced efficiency gains in several areas of the electric generation sector. Niederjohn (2003) reports that employment in electricity generation dropped by 29% in states that underwent restructuring, compared to a 19% overall decrease in the sector's employment. As a group, generators in states that have retained the traditional regulatory structure have seen smaller efficiency gains than generators in restructured states (Wolfram 2005; Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram 2007) . The biggest gains have come in the increased utilization rates of low-cost generation sources.
2 Douglas (2006) estimates that the introduction of centralized regional electricity markets has increased the utilization of low-cost coal-fired power plants, relative to high-cost coal plants, with cost savings between 2% and 3%. Meanwhile, high fuel prices have caused the utilization rates of gas-fired generators to plummet starting in 2000 (Blumsack, Apt and Lave 2005) . 3 The most striking improvement has come from the U.S. nuclear sector, which has increased average utilization (or availability) rates from less than 60% in the 1970s to over 90% in 2006. Blumsack and Lave (2004) and Zhang (2006) present evidence tying these efficiency gains to electricity restructuring, while a different conclusion is reached by Spinner (2006) and the American Public Power Association (2007).
2 Primarily coal and nuclear generation, these low-cost resources represent the "base load" generating assets that operate for days or months at a time. 3 Between 1999 and 2002, the U.S. electric sector added nearly 50 gigawatts (GW) of new gas-fired generation, and around 10 GW of new generation from all other fuel sources combined. During that same period, consumption of natural gas for electricity increased by 50% and wholesale prices for natural gas tripled. Utilization of this new gas capacity was low, since the generators were effectively priced out of the market.
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Overall, the evidence on production efficiency suggests that measurable gains have been made since electric industry restructuring, though the distribution of gains among various facets of the generation sector has varied widely. We may thus conclude that, in general, restructuring has lowered the cost of producing electric power in those areas where restructuring has occurred. As to whether these cost savings have flowed down to consumers in the form of lower prices, the evidence is far less clear.
To date, more than a dozen studies have been produced examining the effects of restructuring on electricity prices (Kwoka 2006, Lave, Apt and Blumsack 2007a,b (2006) and Taber (residential, commercial, industrial, and an average over all rate classes), and perform separate analyses for private and public utilities, as well as a number of different definitions of "restructuring." TCM perform their analysis at the utility level rather than at the state level.
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Their dependent variable of interest is the "price gap" -the difference in prices between utilities that have undergone restructuring and those that have maintained the traditional regulatory and organizational structure. As with other detailed studies of electricity prices, the TCM study includes variables to capture the effects of changes in fuel prices, as well as inter-utility variation in the mix of generating assets. TCM find no evidence that restructuring, however defined, has caused retail electricity prices to decline, relative to utilities that have remained regulated. This main result is robust to many different model specifications.
The existing literature on the relationship between electricity restructuring and retail prices is sufficiently heterogeneous that it is difficult to draw broad conclusions, other than there exists little agreement on whether restructuring has accomplished the policy goal of controlling prices as well as costs. As Kwoka (2006) and Blumsack (2007) point out, perhaps the broadest conclusion that can be drawn is that the studies from industry and consultants have generally found large price savings (or other consumer benefits) from restructuring, whereas studies from academic researchers have found no evidence linking electricity restructuring with lower retail electric rates. This use of dummy variables ignores the fact that "electricity restructuring was not a single event that occurred at one point in time." 8 Within a single state, for example, different utilities chose to join RTOs during different years, or at different times within the same year. In a state-level study, deciding on a single month or year when a particular state transitioned from "regulated" to "restructured" may be arbitrary at some level.
The second problem discussed by Kwoka is that the available retail price data may not reflect all of the relevant regulatory and institutional changes involved in restructuring. During the transition to retail competition, many states imposed caps, freezes, or both on the rates that the incumbent utility could charge to "default" customers (those who did not sign up with a thirdparty competitive supplier). In some cases, these rate caps/freezes were in place for nearly ten years, during which time natural gas prices tripled. Many of the data sets used in the existing literature cover the period where the rate caps were imposed, but not when the rate caps were lifted. The retail price data may reflect these rate caps, but most studies have not modeled or otherwise adjusted for these regulatory actions. In addition, as a part of restructuring legislation, many utilities were allowed to recover "stranded costs," largely through surcharges on customer bills. These stranded cost charges thus drive a wedge between the equilibrium price (which may be modeled as part of an economic study) and the actual price. Finally, the boom in gas-fired generator construction during the early 2000s far outpaced increases in demand. The industry was thus left with a significant amount of excess capacity.
The third issue is the age-old problem of causality. Kwoka criticizes many of the existing studies for drawing causal links between restructuring and electricity prices while failing to account for other covariates which may (or may not) explain more of the variance in electricity prices. In particular, Kwoka criticizes the use of the following model to create a counterfactual set of electricity prices. Let t 1 ,…,t R-1 represent the series of time periods up until period R-1, when restructuring takes place. 9 Data on electricity prices p ti and a set of explanatory variables X ti are gathered, and a model of the form p ti = f(X; β) is estimated, for i = 1,…,R-1. The 8 Kwoka (2006) , Section II.B. 9 As Kwoka points out, assuming the existence of a single point in time dividing the pre-and post-restructuring periods is, in many cases, an oversimplification. We adopt the breakpoint assumption here for simplicity.
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parameter estimate is then used to produce price estimates of p ti , , for the period R defining the beginning of restructuring, to period T, representing some end date. These counterfactual price estimates are then compared to the actual prevailing prices during the same time period. While this would seem a natural method for determining how electricity prices have behaved under restructuring compared to a world where traditional regulation had simply continued, Kwoka suggests that this method may exclude valuable information from the restructuring sample period.
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In this paper, we have gathered a detailed firm-level data set that will allow us to address many of Kwoka's specific critiques. We now turn to a discussion of the data used in this study.
Data and Modeling
The existing evidence suggests that restructuring has improved production efficiency, but whether (or how much of) these efficiency gains have been passed on to consumers is much less clear. Subject to various regulatory lags, rate of return regulation should have promoted a reasonably stable relationship between prices and costs. When costs increased (as when utilities made investments for reliability or resource adequacy), regulators would allow pass-throughs to customers. Traditional methods of price regulation such as price cap regulation (RPI-X) attempted to give utilities incentives to lower costs and prices through production efficiencies (Kahn 1988) .
Under restructuring, generators have generally been free to charge market-based rates, either in bilateral markets or centralized auctions run by RTOs. Cost and performance risk have been at least partially shifted to shareholders in generating companies, rather than customers of distribution utilities. By themselves, none of these factors necessarily imply that costs or prices should move one way or another. Increased wealth through higher productivity and operating efficiency should be shared between customers and generators. Higher costs (rising fuel prices, for example) will cause prices to rise.
10 One particularly relevant example involves the behavior of natural gas prices and investment in natural gas generating units in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The counterfactual method of estimating what prices would have done had regulation simply continued implicitly assumes that the generation mix would remain roughly the same beginning in the late 1990s as it had been in previous decades. In particular, the boom in gas-fired generation would never have occurred. Another example of information that would be left out using the counterfactual method is the wide variety of state-level standards for renewable or alternative electricity generation sources.
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Blumsack, discuss several reasons why, a priori, the form of restructuring undertaken in the U.S. would increase the gap between generating costs and prices faced by consumers. The auction structure used in RTO markets pays generators based on the bid or cost of the marginal unit, whereas under regulation, each generator was effectively paid its average cost. This results in some transfer of wealth from consumers to generators, as low-cost generators are allowed to earn rents (competitive or otherwise). In addition, the total short-run system cost of serving a given amount of load is likely to rise. Another significant factor that may increase cost in the long run is the risk premium placed on non-utility generation and transmission investment. The costs of administering RTO markets are another factor, but on an average basis these have generally been small relative to total costs, and for the most part are declining on a per-unit basis.
We are left with two different price and cost effects of restructuring. If the rise in fuel prices has outweighed the efficiency gains, these increased net costs should be reflected in prices. On the other hand, the auction structure suggests a divergence between costs (particularly those of base load generators) and prices. Either way, the relevant variable is not the price of electricity, but the difference between prices and costs. This analysis thus focuses on the price-cost markup of electricity.
We collected price data covering the period 1990 through 2005 from Average Rates and Typical Bills, a semi-annual publication from the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). EEI collects electric rate data for a large number of investor-owned utilities. Due to high frequencies of nonreporting for some utilities, we excluded some companies from our data set. This issue will be discussed more below, but our final data set includes 71 utilities from 37 different states. 49%
of the utilities in our sample underwent some form of restructuring. A list of the companies in our data set can be found in Appendix A. A highly detailed description of this data set can be found in Appendix B.
The data in the Average Rates and Typical Bills publication is broken up by utility and also by rate class. In this paper we confine our attention to residential, commercial, and industrial rate classes (as well as an overall average rate for each utility). The "average rates" portion of the publication reports twelve-month trailing average electricity prices. Thus, the average rates published in the summer of year t represent an average of the last six months of year t-1 and the 14 first six months of year t. Average rates published in the winter of year t represent an annual average from year t-1. The "typical bills" portion of the publication reports single-period observations of total electric bills by utility and rate class. Thus, the "typical bill" data represents a series of snapshots, while the "average rate" data represents a moving average. In order to maintain consistency with the FERC Form 1 data on which we base our cost estimates (see below and also Appendix C), our price series consists of annual observations for each utility and rate class. The variables we construct from the Average Rates and Typical Bills publications are:
Rate ijt = Average electric rate, in cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for customer class i from utility j in year t. The customer classes we consider are i = {all classes, commercial, residential, industrial}. Electric rates are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index.
Fuel Cost ijt = Fuel cost adjustment, in cents per kWh, allowed to customer class i for utility j in year t by the relevant public utility commission. Not every utility is allowed a fuel cost adjustment in every year. Based on the data in the Form 1 reports, we construct total and average operating cost curves for each utility. The equation we use for the total cost of utility j in year t is:
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Total Cost i,t ($) = Reported Generation Cost i,t + Reported Transmission Expenditures i,t + Reported Distribution Expenditures i,t + Value of Reported Power Purchases i,t -Value of
Reported Sales for Resale i,t .
We highlight several points regarding the total cost equation. First, the effects of higher fuel prices on electricity production costs are reflected in both the generation cost variable (which reflects the cost of a utility producing power from its own plants) and the power purchase variable (which reflects the cost of power that utilities choose to or must buy from the market).
We do not use separate variables for fuel prices, as other studies have done (such as Joskow 2006 and Taber, Chapman and Mount 2006) . We did construct these variables and did test an alternate regression specification including these variables. We found that many of the fuel-mix variables were statistically insignificant and had coefficients that were hard to interpret. The regression results are included in Appendix D. In one respect, our cost variables are superior to using published fuel prices, since we are able to capture inter-utility (not just inter-regional) variations in fuel costs. Finally, the "sales for resale" variable reflects revenues earned by the utility when it sells electricity on the open market.
We then use total reported sales to end-use consumers (in all rate classes) to construct an average cost figure for each utility j in year t, as follows: Our cost variables are adjusted for inflation using the producer price index for utilities. We can now formally define our price-cost markup variable as:
We tested an alternate definition of the price-cost markup representing the percentage difference of price over cost, but found that the regressions had more explanatory power when the markup was defined as the level of price over cost. Regression results from the alternate specification are included in Appendix D.
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We also collected data on annual generation mixes, and total annual generation for each utility, from EIA Form 861. Using the generation mix variables as explanatory variables seemed redundant, given how we constructed our generation cost variable from FERC Form 1 data. We did test a model specification including the generation mix variables as regressors; the output from these models is included in Appendix D. We do use the generation data to construct a measure of self-generation versus exposure to the hourly or bilateral electricity markets:
Kwoka (2006) RTO jt = A dummy variable equal to one for those years in which the jth utility was a member of a FERC-approved RTO.
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Retail ijt = A dummy variable equal to one for those years in which the ith customer class of the jth utility was able to choose between the traditional utility and a third-party competitive supplier for the purchase of generation services.
Divest jt = A dummy variable equal to one during the year(s) in which utility j divested itself of generation assets, whether by voluntary action or regulatory mandate. The variable is equal to one in all years beyond the actual date of divestiture.
We also collected data on the date of expiry of retail price caps/freezes. However, expiration of the price caps generally occurred (or will occur) beyond the end date of our sample. Thus, the price cap variables we constructed were always insignificant in our regressions. (the maximum non-response rate we observed).
Based on the efficiency test in Griliches (1986) , we determined a cutoff of 30% missing observations, before we observed a significant difference in the standard error of our regressions.
We handled the missing observations in two different ways. First, we simply recorded missing observations as zeros and otherwise left the data set untouched. Second, we smoothed the gaps in the missing data using the following moving average process:
where Rate ijt * represents a missing observation for year t. The choice of K* had little effect on the outcome of the regressions, so we used K*=2.
In our regressions, we found that the results were not sensitive to whether we used a smoothing process to fill in the missing data or recorded missing observations as zeros. The results presented here are those for which the data set was unaltered, and missing observations were left as zeros.
We tested the EEI data sets for multiple orders of autocorrelation. Table 1 shows the Ljung-Box Q statistics for the first several orders of autocorrelation. We find evidence of first-order autocorrelation in the time series of electric rates in each customer class. This is confirmed by a simple Breusch-Godfrey test statistic of 10.5, compared to a critical value of 3.8 (for α=0.95). The definition of costs used in this paper includes reported operating and maintenance costs but not capital investment costs. It is possible that some utilities in some years re-allocated costs from O&M to capital in order to increase their rate-base revenues in years of high market prices or uncertainty. This will, in general, reduce the explanatory power of our regression models by increasing the error term. Assuming that the variation in cost allocation among utilities over time is a mean-zero normal random variable, our regression model will take the general form:
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where u and ε are both the standard white-noise error terms (Greene 2002) .
Assuming that all of the variables in X are known with certainty, then our model becomes an errors-in-variables model, but only in the dependent variable. Since , we then get a regression equation of the form:
This equation can be estimated using standard techniques.
Results
In general, we found a persistent gap between the price-cost markups for regulated and restructured utilities, as shown in Figure 2 . The figure is somewhat simplistic in that it defines a restructured utility as one that underwent at least one form of restructuring (wholesale competition, retail competition, or divestiture) between 1994 and 2005. Figure 2 in and of itself does not say very much about the effect of restructuring; rather it suggests some fundamental differences in utilities that restructured versus those that did not. However, the difference between the markups for restructured utilities and regulated utilities has increased over time, particularly beginning in 1998 (when California and Pennsylvania became the first states to embrace modern restructuring). The difference in markups between restructured and regulated utilities also became more pronounced beginning in 2001. This difference is shown graphically in Figure 3 . Since the differences in markups are not constant over time, we investigate utility-specific, market, and regulatory factors that could explain why the price-cost markups have increased much more for restructured utilities than for utilities that remained traditionally regulated. We estimate the following regression equation, for all customer classes i = {all classes together, residential, commercial, and industrial}, all utilities j, and all years t between 1994 and 2005.
Markups for Deregulated and Regulated Utilities, All Customer Classes
Markup ijt =  i0 +  i1 (Year) +  i2 (RTO Dummy ijt ) +  i3 (Retail Competition Dummy ijt ) +  i4 (Divestiture Dummy ijt ) +  i5 (RTORetail ijt ) + i6 (RTO  Divestiture ijt ) +  i7 (Ratio of
Purchases to Generation ijt ) +  i8 (Fuel Cost Adjustment ijt ) +  ijt
We included the interaction terms RTO  Retail ijt and RTO  Divestiture ijt to capture the effects of utilities that undertook two of the components of restructuring, but perhaps not a third (in our sample, there were no utilities that embraced retail competition and divested, but did not join an 21 RTO). We estimate separate models for each rate class, using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (Greene 2002) , correcting for heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. Tables 2 through 5 show the estimated parameters for each of the four models we estimated. 
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The regression results in Tables 2 through 5 demonstrate a more complex relationship between electricity prices and restructuring than in previous studies. First, and perhaps most interestingly, the various customer classes each appear to have been affected differently by restructuring.
Overall, those utilities that divested themselves of generation and had their service territory opened up to retail competition saw their prices rise, but RTOs themselves appear to have had little impact (Table 2 ). Note also in Table 2 that the interaction variable for RTO membership and retail competition is negative, indicating that retail competition in and of itself is associated with higher price-cost markups, while the combination of RTO membership and retail competition is associated with lower price-cost markups (though the combined effect is smaller than the effect of retail competition alone). This would seem to suggest some colinearity among the RTO and retail competition dummy variables. We performed a sensitivity analysis where we removed the interaction variable. A chi-squared test on the regression standard error with and without the interaction variable suggests that removing this variable would introduce some omitted variables bias.
For both residential and industrial customers, the variables for retail competition and divestiture are positive and statistically insignificant. The RTO dummy variable is positive and statistically significant for industrial customers, but not for residential customers. Industrial customers were thought to be the biggest potential beneficiaries of restructuring, so these customers, on average, transitioned away from regulated electric rates faster than the other two classes. Some were able to sign advantageous contracts prior to the beginning of restructuring, but which expired coincidentally with the rise in natural gas prices (Apt 2005) . Overall, the restructuring variables have the least explanatory power (in the sense that most are statistically insignificant at the 5% level) for the commercial rate class. Part of this may be due to the heterogeneity inherent in the commercial rate class. This class of customer includes very small businesses (which may consume less electricity than some homes) and large office buildings.
15
The fuel cost adjustment variable has a parameter estimate that is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant for all four rate classes. The ratio of purchases to generation is statistically significant in all but the regression for the industrial rate class. However, the 15 Earlier data in the EEI publications would allow us to separate small and large commercial users. More recent data, however, groups all commercial users into a single category.
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magnitude of the estimated parameter is quite small. We thus conclude that these two variables have, at best, a marginal impact on price-cost markups for electric utilities.
Concluding Remarks
The question of whether electricity restructuring has lowered prices for consumers has been highly contentious. This paper takes a somewhat different approach than in previous work. We examine how pricecost markups have changed with restructuring, rather than looking at prices themselves (or changes in prices). The logic is simple: there is solid evidence that restructuring has contributed to an increase in productivity and efficiency in electric power generators. The body of evidence on whether these productivity gains have been passed on to consumers is less solid, but overall does not suggest that consumers have experienced windfall gains.
Rather than examining consumer prices per se, we examine differences between reported average prices and average costs for investor-owned utilities that have undergone restructuring and those that have remained traditionally regulated. Using a detailed utility-level data set to measure prices and costs for different rate classes, we find evidence that price-cost margins are significantly higher in regions of the U.S. that have adopted some form of restructuring. Our regression models estimate that, on average, the introduction of retail competition has increased price-cost markups by approximately 2.5 cents per kWh. Utility divestiture has increased pricecost markups by slightly more than 1 cent per kWh. Overall, simply joining an RTO has had little effect on price-cost markups, although the combination of RTO membership and retail 25 competition appears to dampen the increase in price-cost margins. Our finding that price-cost markups have gone up with restructuring suggests that most of the gains from restructuring have, thus far, gone to producers rather than consumers. This may be true for a number of reasons.
Rate caps and freezes in many restructured states have introduced market distortions on the retail side. The reallocation of risks and rewards suggests that firms in the electricity market will demand higher profits in return for shouldering more of the risk of bad investments or management practices.
A natural question at this point is: if generators are earning higher revenues in the RTO auction markets, and if they have lowered their costs by becoming more efficient, where is the money going? One explanation is provided by Bodmer (2006), who demonstrates that share prices of low-cost generators operating in restructured markets have increased dramatically since the late 1990s. Another explanation may be that generating firms are demanding higher returns in exchange for being forced to take on more risk. Given that our data set consists of distribution utilities that are still regulated in some fashion, it is perhaps difficult to square the risk explanation with our particular sample. A third possibility is that firms are able to exercise market power in ways that the RTO market monitors do not detect.
We have improved on previous work, and addressed some of the critiques in Kwoka (2006) by using a firm-level data set, and explicitly accounting for firm-specific fuel price increases, fuel cost adjustments, and stranded cost recovery. We also are able to decompose "restructuring" into three more specific variables. But our study still has some important limitations. The first is that we are not able to properly capture the effects of regulator-mandated price caps for distribution utilities during the transition period from regulation to competition. Where rate caps have come off, the future path of electric prices is uncertain, due in large part to political pressures. Where rate caps have not come off, they will not be lifted for several years. A second limitation is that our data set only includes a sample of investor-owned utilities. We are thus not able to capture any of the effects on municipal, cooperative, or government-owned utilities. A third issue is that the FERC Form 1 data we use to estimate costs likely suffers from significant variations in accounting practices. This does not affect the statistical properties of our estimators, but does make the error terms in our regressions larger than they otherwise would be.
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Finally our data does not capture any of the technological changes taking place in the electric power industry, particularly with regard to distributed generation and microgrids.
To summarize, we find that utilities that have undergone restructuring display significantly higher price-cost markups than utilities that remained traditionally regulated. The combination of introducing retail competition into an electric utility's operating territory and divestiture of that utility's generating assets has increased costs, but has increased prices even more. In particular, we find an average difference of 2 to 3 cents per kWh between prices and costs that is explained by restructuring rather than by increases in fuel prices. We conclude that restructuring has been beneficial to companies that restructured, but the benefits have not reached consumers.
27
Appendix A: List of Companies 
Appendix B: Detailed Description of the EEI Data

Data collection procedures and description of the EEI report dates
EEI publishes the Typical Bill and Average Rate data twice yearly -the winter edition (which is published in April) reports on typical bills based on rates in effect January 1 and the summer edition (which is published in October) reports on typical bills based on rates in effect July 1. The Typical Bill data represents a snapshot of the rates in effect January 1 and July 1. Thus, the Typical Bill data for Winter 1998 would represent rates in effect January 1, 1998, and the Typical Bill data for Summer 1998 would represent rates in effect July 1, 1998. A time series of Typical Bill data would thus represent a series of snapshots through time. CTC components, and (b) , EIA data may contain a mix of default service utilities and competitive suppliers, whereas EEI Average Rate data only represents the investor-owned default service utilities. The EEI data is thus consistent over time, whereas the universe of respondents to the EIA data survey has changed significantly with restructuring.
Summer/Winter Differentials
The EEI Typical Bill data for some editions contains columns RES_DIFF, COMM_DIFF, and IND_DIFF. These are indicator variables for each company showing whether that company has a different rate structure in the summer and in the winter. These columns do not appear in the data series for all editions of the Typical Bill data.
Fuel Cost Adjustments
The fuel cost adjustments (FCA) represent positive or negative differentials to every kilowatthour used, and can vary over rate classes. In the Typical Bill data published by EEI, there is an FCA reported for each company. While these are disaggregated from the rest of the bill, the FCA is included in the Typical Bill data for each customer class. That is, if the FCA for a given company was $1 and a certain bill was $14, the total bill is $14 and not $15 ($14 + $1 for the FCA). The bill without the FCA would be $13.
An FCA of zero for a specific company does not necessarily mean that the company does not have a fuel adjustment clause in place. If the FCA for a given state or company is consistently zero for a large number of years, then it is likely that the given state or company does not include fuel cost adjustments in its rate settlements, but not 100% certain.
Demand charges
The data collected by EEI for the Typical Bill and Average Rate data series do not include a disaggregated demand charge, but the monetary effect of the demand charge does show up in the data. In the Average Rate data, companies report total sales and total revenue, which includes 29 demand charges. Thus, the average rates, in cents per kilowatt-hour, also have demand charges rolled in. The dollar figures in the Typical Bill data also include total payments attributable to demand charges.
Documentation of Average Rate and Typical Bill Data Sets
This section describes the data taken from the EEI publications Average Rates and Typical Bills.
It is a straightforward description of each data column included in the publication.
1. Average Rates -contains information from the EEI Average Rates publication. The publication comes out twice per year, with data on average rates by customer class (commercial, residential, and industrial) . The data at time t reflects a volume-weighted average price for the previous twelve months.
Column Headings:
Company Name -shows the name of the company State -shows the state associated with the company and price data (some companies operate in multiple states; these companies will have multiple entries, one for each state in which they operate).
Date -shows the date of the report Data -shows the time frame covering the twelve-month averaging Rate Portion -shows whether the average price represents a bundled rate (including generation, transmission, delivery, and demand charges) or a specific portion of the bundled rate. Prior to deregulation, utilities were vertically integrated and all price data is bundled. Following deregulation, some companies have split their data submission into generation, transmission, delivery, and stranded-cost charges.
Total -shows the average rate (cents per kWh) for all customers
Residential -shows the average rate (cents per kWh) for the residential class Commercial -shows the average rate (cents per kWh) for the commercial class Industrial -shows the average rate (cents per kWh) for the industrial class 30 2. Typical Bills -contains information from the EEI Typical Bills publication. The publication comes out twice per year, with data on total expenditures by utility and customer class. The data at time t represents total expenditures by the average customer at that time -the typical bill data does not represent a moving average like the Average Rate data set.
Date -shows the date of the report. Winter reports are issued in January and Summer reports are issued in July.
Rate Component -shows whether the average price represents a bundled rate (including generation, transmission, delivery, and demand charges) or a specific portion of the bundled rate. Prior to deregulation, utilities were vertically integrated and all price data is bundled. Following deregulation, some companies have split their data submission into generation, transmission, delivery, and stranded-cost charges.
State Code -a numerical code for each state.
State -shows the state associated with the company and price data (some companies operate in multiple states; these companies will have multiple entries, one for each state in which they operate).
Region -shows the region associated with the company and price data.
Company Code -a numerical code for each company.
Company -shows the name of the company.
Residential FCA -shows the amount of the residential fuel price adjustment (in dollars) charged by the utility and allowed by the public utility commission. The FCA is interpreted as a differential from the previous period's data. If the FCA is x at time t, that says that x amount of the difference between the total expenditures at time t and time t -1 is attributable to fuel cost adjustments. Any remaining difference is attributable to other factors.
Residential Differential -shows whether the company is allowed to charge differentiated rates to residential customers in the summer and the winter. The variable is binary -an entry of 1 indicates that the utility is allowed to charge differentiated rates to residential customers and an entry of 0 indicates that the utility is not allowed to charge differential rates to residential customers.
Commercial FCA -shows the amount of the commercial fuel price adjustment (in dollars) charged by the utility and allowed by the public utility commission. The FCA is interpreted as a differential from the previous period's data. If the FCA is x at time t, that says that x amount of the difference between the total commercial expenditures at time t and time t -1 is attributable to fuel cost adjustments. Any remaining difference is attributable to other factors.
Commercial Differential -shows whether the company is allowed to charge differentiated rates to commercial customers in the summer and the winter. The variable is binary -an entry of 1 indicates that the utility is allowed to charge differentiated rates to commercial customers and an entry of 0 indicates that the utility is not allowed to charge differential rates to commercial customers.
Industrial FCA -shows the amount of the industrial fuel price adjustment (in dollars) charged by the utility and allowed by the public utility commission. The FCA is interpreted as a differential from the previous period's data. If the FCA is x at time t, that says that x amount of the difference between the total industrial expenditures at time t and time t -1 is attributable to fuel cost adjustments. Any remaining difference is attributable to other factors.
Industrial Differential -shows whether the company is allowed to charge differentiated rates to industrial customers in the summer and the winter. The variable is binary -an entry of 1 indicates that the utility is allowed to charge differentiated rates to industrial customers and an entry of 0 indicates that the utility is not allowed to charge differential rates to industrial customers.
The next selection of columns shows the total expenditures, in total dollars, for a typical or average customer in a wide variety of rate classes.
Residential Z -shows total expenditures for a residential consumer using up to Z kWh per month.
Residential Hot Water Heating Z -shows total expenditures for a residential consumer with electric hot water heating using up to Z kWh per month.
Residential All Electric Z -shows total expenditures for a residential consumer with all electric appliances (heat, cooking, etc) using up to Z kWh per month.
Commercial Y x Z -shows total expenditures for a commercial customer with a peak demand of up to Y kW and a total usage of up to Z kWh per month.
Industrial Y x Z -shows total expenditures for an industrial customer with a peak demand of up to Y kW and a total usage of up to Z MWh per month.
Distribution Cost: Total reported expenditures, in nominal dollars, on the distribution assets of a given utility. The source for this data is page 320, line item 126 of the FERC Form 1.
Appendix D: Alternate Model Specifications
In this Appendix, we show regression results for some alternate specifications of our model in Section 4.
D.1 Percentage Price-Cost Markup
The regression results shown in this paper use a "levels" definition of the price-cost markupthat is, the markup is defined as: Tables D.1 through D.4 show the regression results using the percentage markup for each customer class as the dependent variable, rather than the level markup. In general, the formulation based on the percentage markup was found to have little explanatory power, compared to the formulation discussed in the main body of this paper. 
D.2. Inclusion of fuel-mix variables
We also ran our regressions including some measures of the fuel mix of each utility. We note that our price-cost markup variable already incorporates the utility-level reported fuel purchase costs (as in FERC Form 1). Since the influence of fuel prices is already in our regressions, it is not clear what (if any) additional information is provided by the fuel mix variables. The parameter estimates for the fuel mix are often statistically insignificant and difficult to interpret. We include regression results with these fuel mix variables for the sake of completeness. 
